We characterize the complexity of the safety verification problem for parameterized systems consisting of a leader process and arbitrarily many anonymous and identical contributors. Processes communicate through a shared, bounded-value register. While each operation on the register is atomic, there is no synchronization primitive to execute a sequence of operations atomically.
INTRODUCTION
We conduct a systematic study of the complexity of safety verification for parameterized asynchronous shared-memory systems. These systems consist of a leader process and arbitrarily many identical contributors, processes with no identity, running at arbitrary relative speeds. The shared memory consists of a read/write register that all processes can access to perform either a read operation or a write operation. The N-Greens Software: Next-GeneRation Energy-EfficieNt Secure Software. Comunidad de Madrid. (S2013/ ICE-2731) and POLCA: Programming Large Scale Heterogeneous Infrastructures. EU FP7. (610686). Authors' addresses: J. Esparza, Technische Universität München, Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748 Garching, Germany; email: esparza@in.tum.de; P. Ganty, IMDEA Software Institute, Edificio IMDEA Software, Campus Montegancedo UPM, 28223-Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain; email: pierre.ganty@imdea.org; R. Majumdar, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Paul-Ehrlich-Str 26, 67663 Kaiserslautern, Germany; email: rupak@mpi-sws.org. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from"seeds" (leaders, in our nomenclature) and attempt to implement a joint behavior. The design constraints in these systems preclude the possibility of assigning individual identifiers. Instead, each robot is autonomous and interacts asynchronously and anonymously with other robots in the system. They have very limited sensing, computation, and actuation capabilities and are susceptible to crash faults. Owing to the basic sensing and communication capabilities and the faulty nature of interactions, there is no easy way to implement atomic communication primitives: for example, a robot can crash while holding a lock, or other robots in the system can completely miss sensing synchronization messages. Instead, systems such as Robobees [Wood et al. 2013 ] build on distributed protocols inspired by similar behavior in nature, such as swarm behavior in insects or self-assembly at the molecular level. Second, our model can be seen as a simple abstraction for distributed protocols implemented on wireless sensor networks, such as vehicular networks. In these systems, a central coordinator (the base station) communicates with an arbitrary number of participating vehicles, and the system runs concurrently and asynchronously. Anonymity is desirable in these systems for privacy reasons [Laurendeau and Barbeau 2007] and implementing atomic communication primitives can be problematic: for instance, a vehicle might leave the network while holding a lock. Again, protocols in these systems work asynchronously and without synchronization primitives.
On the one hand, our results show bounds on what can be implemented in these models. On the other hand, our algorithms provide the foundations for safety verification of (abstractions of) these systems, and our coNP upper bounds opens the way to the application of SAT-solving or SMT-techniques. However, the focus of this article is understanding the theoretical limitations of the model rather than practical modeling and analysis of these systems.
Related Works. Parameterized verification problems have been extensively studied both theoretically and practically. It is a computationally hard problem: the reachability problem is undecidable even if each process has a finite-state space [Apt and Kozen 1986] . For this reason, special cases have been extensively studied. They vary according to the main characteristics of the systems to verify such as the communication topology of the processes (array, tree, unordered, and so on); their communication primitives (shared memory, unreliable broadcasts, rendezvous, lossy queues, and so on); or whether processes can distinguish from each other (using IDs, a distinguished process, and so on). Prominent examples include broadcast protocols [Esparza et al. 1999; Finkel and Leroux 2002; Dimitrova and Podelski 2008; Delzanno et al. 2010] , in which finite-state processes communicate via broadcast messages; asynchronous programs [Ganty and Majumdar 2012; Viswanathan and Chadha 2009] , in which finite-state processes communicate via unordered channels; finite-state processes communicating via ordered channels [Abdulla et al. 1996] ; microarchitectures [McMillan 1998 ]; cache coherence protocols [Emerson and Kahlon 2003; Delzanno 2003 ]; communication protocols [Emerson and Namjoshi 1998 ]; and multithreaded shared-memory programs [Clarke et al. 2008; Delzanno et al. 2002; Kaiser et al. 2010; La Torre et al. 2010] .
In a seminal article, German and Sistla [1992] studied a parameterized model with rendezvous as communication primitive, in which processes are finite-state machines. They show that safety verification is polynomial time if there are no leaders, but EXPSPACE-complete in the presence of a leader. Remarkably, the absence of atomic coordination in our model brings down the complexity to coNP in the presence of a leader. In the absence of a leader, safety verification is polynomial time in our model as well, even when processes are pushdown machines.
In addition to the model of Hague [2011] , several models close to ours have been previously studied in distributed computing. For example, Guerraoui and Ruppert [2007] studied a model of distributed computing with identity-free, asynchronous processors and nonatomic registers. The emphasis there was the development of distributed algorithm primitives such as timestamping, snapshots, and consensus, using either unbounded registers or an unbounded number of bounded registers. Population protocols [Angluin et al. 2007 ] are a different model for asynchronous, identity-free, processes. In these protocols, arbitrarily many identity-free processes interact asynchronously in rendezvous fashion under the control of a fair scheduler. The emphasis in these works is on describing what functions can be computed in the model. While we present our complexity results for the safety verification problem, we can dually view our results as the computational power of our model. Thus, for example, our results show that asynchronous shared-memory systems, in which the leader and all contributors are pushdown machines and the global store is finite-state, can compute all PSPACE predicates.
FORMAL MODEL: NONATOMIC NETWORKS
In this article, we follow the "systems-as-languages" approach: system actions are modeled as symbols in an alphabet, executions are modeled as words, that is, finite sequences of symbols, and the system itself is modeled as the language of its executions. Operations that combine systems into larger ones are modeled as operations on languages.
Systems as Languages
We recall some basic notions of language theory. An alphabet is a finite, nonempty set of symbols. A word over is a finite sequence of symbols of , and a language is a set of words. As customary, * denotes the language of all words over . The length of a word w is denoted by |w|. The empty word is denoted by ε, and its length is 0. The concatenation of two words x = a 1 · · · a n and y = b 1 · · · b m is the word xy = a 1 · · · a n b 1 · · · b m . The ith symbol (1 ≤ i ≤ |w|) of a word w is denoted by (w) i , and the subsequence (w) i (w) i+1 . . . (w) j , where (1 ≤ i, j ≤ |w|), is denoted by (w) i.. j . We use regular expressions to denote languages. A regular expression over the alphabet is defined inductively using the grammar r ::= ∅ | ε | a | r 1 + r 2 | r 1 · r 2 | r * , where a ∈ . A regular expression r denotes a language L(r) defined inductively as follows:
, y ∈ L(r 2 )}, and L(r * ) = {x 1 . . . x k | k ≥ 0 and x i ∈ L(r) for each i = 1, . . . , k}. We often speak of "the system L," where L is a language, meaning the system whose set of executions is L.
Combining systems: Shuffle. Intuitively, the shuffle of two systems is the result of putting them side by side, letting them run in parallel, without any kind of communication between them, and looking at them as one single system. In the systems-aslanguages approach, the two systems are two languages L 1 ⊆ Example 2.2. Let 1 = {a, c} and 2 = {b, c}. For L 1 = (ac) * and L 2 = (bc) * we get
Observe that L 1 L 2 does not only depend on L 1 , L 2 , but also on the alphabets 1 and 2 . For example, if 1 = {a} and 2 = {b}, then {a} {b} = {ab, ba}, but if 1 = {a, b} = 2 , then {a} {b} = ∅. Thus, we should more properly write L 1 1 , 2 L 2 . However, since the alphabets 1 and 2 will be clear from the context, we will omit them.
We describe systems as combinations of shuffles and asynchronous products; for instance, we write L 1 (L 2 L 3 ). In these expressions, we assume that binds tighter than ; thus, L 1 L 2 L 3 is the language (L 1 L 2 ) L 3 , and not L 1 (L 2 L 3 ).
Like shuffle, asynchronous product is also associative and commutative; thus, we
Moreover, unlike shuffle, it is idempotent, that is, L L = L. More generally, it follows immediately from the definition of the asyn-
The following lemma generalizes this property even further.
we get w ∈ L L by the definition of the asynchronous product.
(3) Let w ∈ Proj (L L). This means that there is a w ∈ L L whose projection Proj (w ) = w. It follows from the definition of asynchronous product and
In what follows, we extend regular expressions with the and operators, with the obvious semantics.
In the following, we assume the following results known from language theory (e.g., see Hopcroft and Ullman [1979] ). The regular languages are closed under shuffle product and asynchronous product. Moreover, given finite-state machines for two languages, we can construct in polynomial time a finite-state machine for their shuffle product or asynchronous product. A similar result holds for the shuffle or asynchronous product of a context-free language and a regular language (see Appendix A): given a pushdown automaton (or a context-free grammar) for the context-free language, and given a finite-state machine for the regular language, we can construct in polynomial time a pushdown automaton or a context-free grammar for their shuffle or asynchronous product. The constructions are similar to those employed to prove closure under the more familiar operation of intersection.
Nonatomic Networks
A nonatomic network is an infinite family of systems parameterized by a number k. The kth element of the family has k + 1 components communicating through a global store by means or read and write actions. The store is modeled as one single global variable with a possibly very large, but finite, set of values corresponding to all possible configurations of the store. One of the k + 1 components is the leader, while the other k are the contributors. All contributors have exactly the same possible behaviors (they are copies of the same language), while the leader may behave differently. The network is called nonatomic because components cannot atomically execute sequences of actions, only one single read or write.
Formally, we fix a finite set G of global values. A read-write alphabet is any set of the form A × G, where A is a set of read and write actions, or just reads and writes. We denote a letter (a, g) ∈ A × G by a(g) and define
We fix two languages D and C, called the leader and the contributor, with alphabets D = G(r d , w d ) and C = G(r c , w c ), respectively, where r d , r c are called reads and w c , w d are called writes. We write w (resp., r ) to stand for either w c or w d (respect., r c or r d ). We further assume that (i) for each value g ∈ G, there is a word in the leader or contributor that reads or writes g (if not, the value is never used and is removed from G); and (ii) that both D and C are prefix-closed languages.
Additionally, we fix a language S, called the store, over the alphabet D ∪ C . It models the sequences of read and write operations supported by an atomic register: a write w (g) writes g to the register, while a read r (g) succeeds when the register's current value is g. In other words, the store is always willing to execute any write, but it is only willing to execute a read action whose value coincides with the value of the last write. Initially, the store is only willing to execute a write. Formally, u ∈ ( D ∪ C ) * belongs to S if and only if for each position p such that (u) p = r (g) for some g ∈ G, there exists an earlier position p < p such that (u) p = w (g) and (u) p +1.. p ∈ (r (g)) * . Alternatively, S can also be defined as the language of the regular expression
Observe that S is completely determined by D and C , and that S is prefix-closed. 
We omit the prefix (D, C) when it is clear from the context, and call N and N k the network and the k-instance of the network, respectively. It follows from the properties of shuffle and asynchronous product that Notation 2.5. We often speak of the projection of a language L onto the alphabet of the leader or the contributor. To lighten the notation, we write Proj
It is convenient to introduce a notion of compatibility between a word of the leader and a multiset of words of the contributor. Intuitively, compatibility means that all the words can be interleaved into a legal sequence of reads and writes, that is, a sequence supported by an atomic register. Formally: Definition 2.6. Let u ∈ * D , and let M = {v 1 , . . . , v k } be a multiset of words over * C (possibly containing multiple copies of a word). We say that u is compatible with M if and only if (u S k i=1 v i ) = ∅. Because it makes the exposition easier to follow, our examples use (read/write) finitestate automata to denote languages. A finite-state automaton (FSA) is a tuple A = (Q, G(r, w), , q 0 , F), where Q is a finite set of states with an initial state q 0 ∈ Q and a set of accepting states F ⊆ Q, G(r, w) is a read-write alphabet, and ⊆ (Q × (G(r, w) ∪ {ε}) × Q) is a set of transitions. The language L(A) is defined as usual.
Example 2.7. Figure 2 shows an example of a nonatomic network with G = {1, 2, 3, $}. The languages D and C are represented using FSAs. In particular, D contains six words (the six prefixes of the word
, while C contains infinitely many words.
Consider the 1-instance N 1 = (D S C) of the network. For instance, we have
To prove it, we have to show that the projections of u onto D , C and their union are words of D, C, and S, respectively. Observe first that, since the alphabet of the store (i.e., D , ∪ C ) contains all reads and writes, the projection of any word onto D ∪ C is always the word itself. Thus, we have to show u ∈ S, which, since S = g∈G (w (g) (r (g)) * ) * , is indeed the case. The projections of u onto D and C are w d (1) r d (2) and r c (1) w c (2), which are words of D and C. In the terminology of Definition 2.6, w d (1) r d (2) is compatible with the singleton set {r c (1) w c (2)}.
The 2-instance N 2 = (D S (C C)) contains the word
To prove this, we first observe that (1) is a legal sequence of reads and writes, and so it belongs to S. Now, we take
and show that v is compatible with {v 1 , v 2 } by proving that (1) belongs to (v S (v 1 v 2 )). For this, we label the contributor actions of (1) by 1 and 2 such that the projection onto the actions labeled by 1 yield v 1 , and analogously for v 2 , while the projection onto the actions without a label yields v:
THE SAFETY VERIFICATION PROBLEM
In our systems-as-languages approach, D is the language of possible executions of the code of the leader. We assume that this code has been instrumented so that, when an error occurs, the leader writes a special error value in the store, modeled by the symbol $. Formally, a word u of a (D, C)-network N is unsafe if it ends with an occurrence of w d ($); N is safe if and only if it contains no unsafe word. Observe that, if N is safe, then no instance of the network-whatever the number of contributors-can produce an error. Safety can also be defined in other ways: we could declare a word unsafe if it ends with an occurrence of w c ($), or even with an occurrence of w ($). As we will see, our complexity results are the same for any of these choices.
Safety as emptiness.
From this point on, we will make the following assumption: every word u in D ends with w d ($), formally (u) |u| = w d ($) for every u ∈ D. This comes with no loss of generality and allows the safety checking problem to be reduced to a language emptiness problem: N is safe if and only if N = ∅. However, observe that D is no longer prefix closed as seen when comparing the leader in Figure 3 and Figure 2 . This also holds for N .
Example 3.1. Consider again the network of Example 2.7. A bit of reasoning shows that no word of the 1-instance N 1 is unsafe. During the execution of such a word, the leader must move at some point from q 2 to q 3 by reading a 1, then later from q 3 to q 4 by reading a 3. The 1 and the 3 read by the leader must be previously written by the contributor. However, after writing the 1, the contributor is necessarily in state p 5 , from where it cannot reach p 1 to write a 3. This example provides an important intuition. If we view D as the language of a (possibly infinite) state machine, then the safety problem becomes the problem of deciding whether the leader, helped by the contributors, can reach a state from which it can write $ (state q 4 in the example). For this, the leader must overcome obstacles in the form of read actions: often, the leader can only perform an action r d (g) if it is helped by a contributor that performs w c (g). In the example, the leader must overcome obstacles at states q 1 , q 2 , and q 3 .
We study the complexity of safety verification for networks in which the read-write languages D and C of leader and contributor are generated by an abstract machine, like an FSA or a pushdown automaton (PDA). More precisely, given two classes of machines D, C (like FSA or PDA), we study the safety problem Safety(D, C) defined as follows:
In the next sections, we prove that Safety(FSA, FSA), Safety(PDA, FSA), and Safety(FSA, PDA) are coNP-complete, while Safety(PDA, PDA) is PSPACE-complete. Remarkably, the complexity in all cases is lower than that of the problem:
In particular, it is well known that networks with a PDA-leader, a store, and one single PDA-contributor (i.e., the inputs of Safety non parametric(PDA, PDA) with k = 1) are Turing powerful. In such a network, leader and contributor can use their stacks to simulate a queue, and it is well known that finite-state machines whose transitions act over one queue are Turing-powerful. Having arbitrarily many contributors turns out to be a disadvantage for the network. Intuitively, the reason is that the leader cannot know whether the value it reads in the store has been written by a contributor that has read its last message, or perhaps by some other contributor that has missed the last part of the computation.
THE SIMULATION LEMMA
Given a network N = (D S ∞ C) , the Simulation Lemma constructs a finite set {Sim g | g ∈ G} of simulators, one for each value of G, such that
Recall from Lemma 2.
holds for every language L; thus, in particular, we can rewrite Equation (4) as
Thus, informally, the Simulation Lemma states that the leader cannot distinguish (S ∞ C) from (S g∈G Sim g ): when composed with these two systems, it executes exactly the same sequences. We can thus say that the simulators are able to simulate an unbounded number of contributors.
Notation 4.1 (The special action w c (#)). In order to define the simulators, we assume without loss of generality that the alphabet C contains a special action w c (#). This action is best understood as a corrupting write. It adds the capability for simulators to overwrite the store with a value that nobody can read. After a corrupting write, a read can only happen after the store is overwritten with a value in G. The alphabet of the simulator Sim g is thus G(r c ) ∪ {w c (g), w c (#)}. That is, Sim g can read arbitrary values, but can only write the value g or corrupt the store.
Informally, the behavior of the simulator is as follows. As long as C does not execute w c (g), the simulator behaves like C, just replacing every write w c (g ) by a corrupting write, that is, by w c (#). If C executes w c (g), then the simulator also executes w c (g); from this moment on, it keeps executing w c (g) an arbitrary number of times. The rationale for this definition is the following intuition (formalized in Lemma 4.8 as the Copycat Lemma): If a contributor can execute a sequence of reads and writes as a component of a network, then arbitrarily many contributors can execute the same sequence by copying the behavior of the first: if the first contributor reads a value, then the replicators read the same value immediately after; if the first contributor writes a value, the replicators write the same value immediately after. This is possible because replicating a read or a write does not change the value of the store. Note that the Copycat Lemma would not hold in a setting with atomic actions: if the first contributor read a value and wrote a different value to the store atomically, the next contributors would be stuck. 
obtained from Equation (2) by replicating v 2 . We construct a word of (v S (v 1 v 2 v 3 )) from the word of Equation (1) and Equation (3) by inserting the actions of v 3 right after the actions of v 2 , as follows:
Intuitively, the new word describes a behavior of the network N 3 in which the third contributor behaves as a copycat of the second one: it reads or writes the same value immediately after the second contributor reads or writes. In the same way, we can add further copies v 4 , v 5 , . . . of v 2 to the multiset. Therefore, once a contributor executes one w c (g) action (this would be w c (3) in our example), arbitrarily many replicators are ready to supply the leader with as many w c (g) actions as it may need for its r d (g)-obstacles, and that is what the simulator does. Formally, Sim g is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3. Given a leader D and a contributor C, define for every g ∈ G, C g as the language C/{w c (g)}, where L 1 /L 2 , the right quotient operation, returns the set {w | ∃x ∈ L 2 : w x ∈ L 1 }. That is, C g is the set of words u satisfying u w c (g) ∈ C. Let C 
Example 4.4. Figure 5 gives the four simulators Sim 1 , Sim 2 , Sim 3 , Sim $ for the contributor of Figure 2 . Because Sim $ = {ε}, we deliberately forget to mention it in subsequent developments. The fact that Sim g is not necessarily prefix closed can be seen on its corresponding FSA, in which not all states are final.
We are now ready to formulate the Simulation Lemma. 
Before proving the Simulation Lemma, we illustrate it by means of a couple of examples.
Example 4.6. Consider again the example of Figure 2 , but with a different leader D given by the prefix-closure of the word It is easy to see that in the new network the leader can execute u given at Equation (7). For example, the leader and 200 contributors can execute together
whose projection onto D yields u. Note that, to execute the 300 contributor writes (100 times w c (1), 100 times w c (2) and 100 times w c (3)) as required by u, 200 contributors suffices. By visiting state q 0 twice, the same contributor can perform w c (2) and w c (3). By the Simulation Lemma, the leader must also be able to execute u in the simulating network (D S (Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 )), and this is indeed the case: taking
Example 4.7. Let us discuss a slight variation of Example 4.6, in which the contributor transition from q 1 to q 2 executes a w c (2) instead of r c (1) and transition from q 0 to q 1 executes a w c (3) instead of w c (2). After this change, the leader and 101 contributors can execute together
The fact that we need 99 contributors less than in Example 4.6 is due to the fact that 1 contributor will execute 100 times w c (3) and 100 contributors execute w c (2) and w c (1). With the change, the simulators become as follows, Sim 3 remains the same; Sim 2 now consists of a single accepting state with a self-loop executing w c (2); and, in Sim 1 , the transition from s 1 to s 2 executes a w c (#) instead of r c (1). To avoid ambiguities, we denote those languages Sim i , i = 1, 2, 3.
Again, by the Simulation Lemma, the leader must also be able to execute u in the simulating network D S (Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 ) , and this is indeed the case: taking
Proof of the Simulation Lemma
We start by giving a precise formulation of the Copycat Lemma discussed in the main text. It intentionally comes with no proof because we think it is trivial. To avoid ambiguities, let us recall that 
C . If v is compatible with M and v is a prefix of some word of M, then v is also compatible with M ⊕ {v } (the multiset obtained by adding one copy of v to M).
Recall that, in order to produce an unsafe word, contributors may have to help the leader to overcome the read obstacles in its path to the action w d ($). Now, assume that a contributor executes a sequence of actions ending with a write w c (g). As a consequence of the Copycat Lemma, arbitrarily many contributors may execute the same sequence, but stopping short of w c (g). These contributors can then help the leader to overcome any number of future obstacles r d (g). This is the idea that we exploit to prove the Simulation Lemma.
We start the proof with a simple result, which we first illustrate by means of an example. PROOF. Erasing reads and corrupting writes by contributors does not affect the sequence of values written to the store and read by the leader, hence compatibility is preserved.
Example 4.10. Consider the words
Then u is compatible with {v 1 , v 2 }, as shown by the sequence
By Lemma 4.9, the word u is also compatible with the multiset M = {v 1 , v 2 }, where v 1 = w c (1) and v 2 = w c (2), because they can be obtained from v 1 and v 2 by removing only reads and corrupting writes. We can, for instance, interleave u,
which is a legal sequence of reads and writes.
We are now in a position to prove the Simulation Lemma.
PROOF OF THE SIMULATION LEMMA (LEMMA 4.5) (⊆): We present simultaneously the proof and an example. Fix y ∈ *
Example:
Define g 1 , . . . , g n to be the sequence of values written to the store by the contributors in the order of their first writes in x. Hence, we have that all values g i are pairwise distinct. We also define p 1 , . . . , p n as the positions in x in which these writes happen; hence,
Further define id 1 , . . . , id n to be temporarily assigned contributor identifiers such that id i is the contributor writing g i at position p i in x, and x id i is the sequence that it executes.
id 1 = 1 and id 2 = 1, that is, the first writes of both w c (1) and w c (3) are executed by contributor 1.
Next, we use the Copycat Lemma to show that without loss of generality we can make further assumptions on x. First, we can assume that all identifiers id i are pairwise distinct. This is not the case in our example, where id 1 = id 2 = 1, and we show how to repair this. If id i = id j for some i < j, we first add a new contributor that executes a copy of x id i . By the Copycat Lemma, adding this copycat preserves compatibility, hence nonemptiness. Then, we assign the first write to g j to the copycat, which allows breaking of the equality id i = id j . Example: Add:
Redefine:
We have: x ∈ (x 1 x 2 x 3 ).
Assign: first w c (1) of x to x 1 , first w c (3) of x to x 3 .
Now:
id 1 = 1 and id 2 = 3.
. Next, we delete from x the following contributor reads:
(1) for every i = 1, . . . , n, all the reads of contributor id i after position p i ; (2) all the reads of all contributors not in {id 1 , . . . , id n }.
Lemma 4.9 shows that nonemptiness is preserved, that is, y S x = ∅ still holds.
Example: We delete r c (3) in x 1 and x 3 , and all reads of x 2 .
x 2 := w c (1)
Now, we stepwise transform x id 1 , . . . , x id n further, so that at the end of the process, x id i contains only writes w c (g i ) and possibly w c (#). Further, we ensure that each transformation preserves nonemptiness. In a first step, for every contributor i different from id 1 , . . . , id n , and for every j = 1, . . . , n, we delete every occurrence of w c (g j ) in x i , and append it to x id j . Since x id j executes the first occurrence of w c (g j ), this transformation preserves nonemptiness.
Example: We "transfer" the occurrence of w c (1) in x 2 to x 1 .
x 2 := ε
After this step, the only nonempty sequences are x id 1 , . . . , x id n . Moreover, by the definition of C g i , the prefix of x id i ending at position p i − 1 belongs to C g i . For the second step, recall that contributor id i executes the occurrence of w c (g i ) at position p i . Consider the writes w c (g j ) in x id i , where j = i. We classify them into early writes (before the action at p i ) and late writes (after the action). Now, for each i = 1, . . . , n and every j = i, we proceed as follows:
(a) delete every late write w c (g j ) in x id i , and append it to x id j . (b) replace every early write w c (g j ) by w c (#) in x id i , and append it to x id j .
Example: We have id 1 = 1, and id 2 = 3. In x 1 , there are no early writes, and w c (3) is the only late write. Thus, we delete w c (3), and add it to x 3 .
Now, in x 3 , there is now only an early write, namely, w c (1). Thus, we replace it by w c (#), and add it to x 1 .
After (a), we have
+ . Indeed, all reads and all writes w c (g j ) have been removed, thus only w c (g i )s remain. After both (a) and (b), we have
where s g ∈ Sim g , that is compatible with u.
Let M be the multiset containing n g copies of the word v g w c (g) for each word s g of the form s g = v g w c (g) n g . Using a copycat-like argument, it is easy to see that M is compatible with u. Moreover, since the values written by a corrupting write are never read, u is also compatible with the multiset M containing n g copies of u g w c (g). Finally, since u g w c (g) ∈ C, we have that M is a multiset over ∞ C; thus, we finally obtain
SAFETY(FSA, FSA) IS coNP-COMPLETE
We study the safety verification problem for FSAs, that is, we consider the problem Safety(FSA, FSA):
Given:
Is the network (D S ∞ C) safe? We prove that the problem is coNP-complete. In order to state results about complexity, we must define the size of the input precisely. We define the size of an FSA (Q, G(r, w) , , q 0 , F) as the maximum between |Q|, |G(r, w)| and | | where for any set S, the notation |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
SAFETY(FSA, FSA) is coNP-Hard
We give a reduction from 3SAT to the complement of the safety verification problem. Intuitively, the leader uses the contributors to guess and store an assignment, and then checks if each clause is satisfied. (Observe that the leader cannot store the assignment in its internal state, because then the number of states of D would be at least equal to the number of assignments, and so exponential in the size of the formula.) Since a variable may appear in several clauses, during the check phase the leader may have to ask the contributors several times which value it guessed. We design a protocol to ensure that it always receives the same answer. The leader uses the contributors to guess and store an assignment, then checks if each clause is satisfied. Each contributor stores one value of the assignment. More precisely, the regular expressions for D and C capture exactly the prefix closure of D and C , respectively, where
where the regular expressions Guess i , Store i , and Check j are described next, and we use ";" to clearly denote concatenation.
Guessing and retrieving truth values. During Guess i , the leader guesses a value for variable x i . Since x i may appear in several clauses, during the checks it may ask the contributors several times which value it guessed. We use the following protocol to ensure that it always receives the same answer. We choose the following set G of store values:
and we set
Thus, in order to assign a value to x i , the leader writes set[x i ] to the global store. The contributors who read set[x i ] propose a value for x i by writing propose[x i → j] for some j ∈ {0, 1}. The leader reads the store at some (nondeterministic) point, and reads the last write of the contributors, which proposes either 0 or 1. If it reads propose[x i → 0] (the 1 case is identical), then it commits to setting x i to 0 by writing commit[
Contributors who read commit[x i → 0] move on to the next phase, in which they return 0 every time that they are asked the value of x i . Contributors who miss the commit message are stuck. This protocol ensures that the leader and contributors can reach consensus on the value of x i . Notice that an arbitrary number of contributors can participate and potentially overwrite each other, but x i is still assigned one single value.
Checking clauses. The leader uses this protocol to "assign" nondeterministically chosen consensus values to each variable x 1 , . . . , x n , and proceeds to check that the assignment satisfies the clauses. To check a clause, it gets the literals from the contributors and checks if the clause is satisfied. Assume, for instance, that the j-th clause is x 2 ∨¬x 3 . Then
Suppose that the formula is satisfiable. Then, there is an execution of the protocol in which the contributors reach a consensus for each bit corresponding to a satisfying assignment, and the leader succeeds in checking all clauses. Then, the value $ gets written to the store and the (D, C)-network accepts. On the other hand, if the formula is unsatisfiable, then the leader never succeeds in checking all clauses and $ never gets written. Note that the regular expressions D and C have size O(m+ n). Then, regular expressions are transformed into equivalent FSAs in linear time. Those are prefix closed by setting every state as accepting. Hence, we have obtained FSA representations equivalent to the regular expressions D and C, and we are done.
Note that the FSAs for D and C provided by the reduction from SAT satisfy the following property: for every two transitions (q, a 1 , q 1 ) and (q, a 2 , q 2 ), if q 1 = q 2 , then a 1 and a 2 are read actions, and they read different values. We call such FSAs deterministic, because at every configuration of the network, at most one of the transitions of the FSA can occur. Thus, loosely speaking, all the nondeterminism necessary to solve SAT in polynomial time is provided by the inherent nondeterminism of interleaving, and not by the FSAs themselves. This immediately suggests the following nondeterministic algorithm for checking language nonemptiness:
(1) guess a word u ∈ D (it necessarily ends with w d ($)); (2) guess a set of words M = {s g ∈ Sim g | g ∈ G}; (3) nondeterministically check that u is compatible with the set M by guessing a word v ∈ ( D ∪ C ) * and checking that v ∈ (u S g∈G s g ). The number of words to guess is |G| + 1. Since we assume that every value of G appears in some transition of D or C (otherwise, that value can be removed), the number of words to be guessed is linear in the size of the FSAs D and C. For example, for the network of Figure 2 , we get the simulators of Figure 5 ; thus, we need to guess four words (in Sim 1 , Sim 2 , Sim 3 , and Sim $ ). Further, by the definition of the g-simulator (Definition 4.3), we can easily construct an FSA A g recognizing Sim g from the FSA C recognizing C by means of the following four steps:
It is well known that regular language is closed for the right quotient operation. Moreover, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that takes in input C and returns an FSA for C g . (iv) Finally, given the FSA of point (iii), compute an FSA for
This can be done, for instance, by adding a new (initial and also final) state q whose unique transition is labeled with ε and leads to the initial state of the FSA for C # g . Applying these steps to the FSA for C shown in Figure 2 yields the FSAs shown in Figure 5 . Clearly, these FSAs have linear size in the size of C.
However, the algorithm given by Steps (1) through (3) is not necessarily polynomial, because both u and the words of M could be arbitrarily long. To solve these problems, we first have a closer look at the words of M. We prove the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma, a general lemma valid for arbitrary languages, showing that we can pick s g as a minimal word according to a certain order.
Contributor Monotonicity Lemma
Before stating the lemma, we need some language-theoretic definitions.
Let be an alphabet and u, v ∈ * . We say that u is a (scattered) subword of v, denoted u v, if u can be obtained from v by deleting some occurrences of symbols. Thus, for instance, ab bacb. Given ⊆ , we say that u is a (scattered) -subword of v, denoted u v, if u can be obtained from v by deleting some occurrences of symbols that do not belong to , but leaving all symbols from . Equivalently, u v if u v and Proj (u) = Proj (v). In particular, we have u v if and only if u ∅ v. In Figure 5 , we have
Given two languages
, which has several supports, including {ε} and {ε, r c (1)w c (1)}. Note that each w c (1)-support must include
We can now state the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma. Intuitively, it states that the leader cannot distinguish the simulator Sim g from a w c (g)-support of it. 
LEMMA 5.4 (CONTRIBUTOR MONOTONICITY LEMMA). For every g ∈ G, let Sim g be a w c (g)-
By the definition of w c (g)-support, Sim g contains a word s g such that either s g = ε = s g , or s g is obtained from s g by erasing reads and corrupting writes. Since erasing these symbols does not affect compatibility (Lemma 4.9), u is compatible with {s g | g ∈ G}, and we are done.
Example 5.5. Figure 6 shows three possible supports for the simulators of Figure 5 . Observe that the languages of the supports are of the form (ε + L w c (g) + ), where L is a finite language. In particular, if C is the language of a state machine with n states, then we can always find a support for Sim g of the form (ε + L w c (g) + ) such that the words of L have at most length n − 1. In other words, in this case, we can replace the simulator by a "faster" support that starts writing g after at most (n − 1) steps.
Membership in coNP
We now combine the proof outline in Section 5.2 with the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma to derive an upper bound for the safety verification problem for FSAs. PROOF. Let D and C be FSAs recognizing D and C. Applying Steps (i) through (iv) (see Section 5.2) to C, we obtain for every g ∈ G an FSA A g recognizing Sim g . One of the accepting states is the initial state, while each of the others has an input transition labeled by w c (g), and a self-loop labeled by w c (g) as unique output transition (see Figure 5 ). Further, these are the only transitions labeled by w c (g).
Recall the nondeterministic procedure of Section 5.2:
(1) guess a word u ∈ D (remember that such words necessarily end with w d ($)); (2) guess a set of words M = {s g ∈ Sim g | g ∈ G}; (3) nondeterministically check that u is compatible with the set M by guessing a word v ∈ ( D ∪ C ) * and checking that v ∈ (u S g∈G s g ). By the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma, in
Step (2), we can restrict the guess of M to words s g in a w c (g)-support Sim g of Sim g . To profit from this, we choose Sim g as the words accepted by runs of A g that visit every nonfinal state at most once. It is easy to see that, by the properties of A g described earlier, this is indeed a w c (g)-support. In our example, these supports are recognized by the FSAs shown in Figure 6 . It follows that we can safely limit the guess of Step (2) to words s g of the form s g = s g w c (g) n g , where s g ∈ C # g , |s g | is bounded by the number of states of C (if s g = ε, then s g = ε and n g = 0). Thus, intuitively, we can always choose s g as the concatenation of a short head and a possibly very long but very simple tail, consisting of n g repetitions of w c (g).
However, the nondeterministic procedure still has two problems. The word u could be arbitrarily long, thus not "guessable" in polynomial time; the same could hold for the numbers n g . In the rest of the proof, we show that, as a matter of fact, we do not have to guess either n g or u. We reason as follows: if N is unsafe, then there is a word u ∈ D compatible with a set {s g w c (g) n g | g ∈ G}, where s g = ε implies n g > 0. Notice that s g , which belongs to C # g , is over alphabet G(r c ) ∪ {w c (#)}. Thus, s g contains no occurrences of w c (g) and there is a word s ∈ g∈G s g w c (g) n g such that (u S s) = ∅. Let s be the result of removing from s, for every g ∈ G, all occurrences of w c (g) but the first one. We call s the skeleton of s. Now, we replace this procedure with the following:
(a) Guess a subset G of G and guess a set of words {s g ∈ C # g | g ∈ G , |s g | ≤ |C|}. Intuitively, the set G contains all values written at least once by the contributors to the global store along some run leading to a write w d ($). This step can be performed in quadratic time, because every s g has linear length in |C|, and G has linear size in |C| + |D|. (b) Guess a skeleton s ∈ g∈G (s g w c (g)). This can also be done in quadratic time. (c) Construct an FSA recognizing the following language: Example 5.7. Consider again the network of Figure 2 . We apply Steps (a) through (e) to show that it is nonsafe. At Step (a), we guess words of Sim 1 , Sim 2 , Sim 3 :
Step (b), we guess the skeleton
Step (c), we construct an FSA for D S Sk (s ) by adding self-loops to the straightline FSA for s :
Finally, at Steps (d) and (e), we apply the asynchronous product construction to this FSA, the FSA for D of Figure 2 , and the 5-state automaton for S. The resulting FSA is nonempty. Let us see that, for instance, it accepts the word
Indeed, (8) is a legal sequence of reads and writes, thus it belongs to S; its projection onto the actions of the leader is accepted by D, thus it belongs to (D S); finally, its projection onto the actions of the contributors is equal to the skeleton s (thus, in this case, we have s = s ), thus it belongs to D S Sk (s ) .
A Useful Intuition
Let = {a 1 , . . . , a n } be an alphabet. Then, there is an FSA of size polynomial in n that recognizes the language a * 1
. . . a * n : the FSA has a single (initial as well as final) state, and self-loops for each letter. However, consider the slightly modified language
where a + i = a i a * i denotes one or more occurrences of a i for each i. The smallest FSA for L + is exponential in n; intuitively, the FSA must remember the subset of that has been seen and check at the end that all letters in have been seen. Now, fix any linear ordering < on , and consider the subset L + < of L + , in which we additionally require that the first occurrences of letters in a word satisfy the ordering <. With this stipulation, there is an FSA of size polynomial in n for this language. For example, if a 1 < a 2 < · · · < a n , then the FSA recognizes a 1 a * 1 a 2 (a 1 + a 2 ) * . . . a n (a 1 +. . . a n ) * . Moreover, the union of these languages over of all orderings of is exactly the language L + . In the following proofs, we often require constructing FSAs for languages similar to L + and checking that their intersection with some other language is nonempty. Instead of directly constructing the exponentially large FSA, we use nondeterminism to guess an ordering of first occurrences, and check that the corresponding intersection with L of first occurrences of writes. Similar constructions appear in more explicit form in the following sections.
SAFETY(PDA, FSA) IS coNP-COMPLETE
We consider the case in which only the leader is a PDA, while the contributors are FSAs. The proof is a rather straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 5.6, and serves as a gentle introduction to the more involved cases of the next sections.
We first recall basic definitions and notations on PDAs. A (read/write) PDA is a 7-tuple P = (Q, G(r, w), , , Z 0 , q 0 , F) , where Q is a finite set of states including the initial state q 0 and a set F ⊆ Q of accepting states, is a stack alphabet that contains the initial stack symbol Z 0 , and
* × * , where q is the state of the PDA, w is the input tape and α is the pushdown tape. Let P be the relation on the configurations of P defined as follows: for Z ∈ , x ∈ ∪ {ε}, we have (q, xw, α Z) P (q , w, αγ ), called a move, if and only if (q, Z, x, q , γ ) ∈ . Furthermore, let * P denote the reflexive transitive closure of P . A configuration ( p, w, α) is accepting whenever w = ε and p ∈ F. A sequence
of k ≥ 0 moves is a run if p 1 = q 0 and α 1 = Z 0 . Furthermore, the run is said to be accepting if its last configuration is accepting. The language of a PDA P is the set
In other words, L(P) is the set of words for which there is an accepting run of P. The size of a rule (q, γ, a, q , x) ∈ is defined as |x| + 5, and the size |P| of a PDA as the sum of the size of rules in . THEOREM 6.1. Safety(PDA, FSA) is in coNP.
PROOF. Recall Steps (a) through (e) in the nondeterministic algorithm for the complement of Safety(FSA, FSA) in Theorem 5.6. We adapt this algorithm to a nondeterministic algorithm for the complement of Safety(PDA, FSA). Steps (a) through (c) do not change. Steps (d) and (e) are replaced by: (d') Construct a PDA recognizing all words in D S Sk (s ) . To see that this can be achieved in polynomial time, we apply a well-known result stating that the asynchronous product of a context-free language recognized by a PDA P and a regular language recognized by an FSA A is a context-free language, and a PDA for the asynchronous product can be constructed in polynomial time from P and A. (e') Check language nonemptiness for the PDA obtained at Step (d'). Recall that PDA emptiness can be decided in polynomial time in the size of the PDA.
SAFETY(FSA, PDA) IS coNP-COMPLETE
We show that even if all contributors (but not the leader) have access to a stack, the safety verification problem remains in coNP. The lower bound follows, of course, from Section 5.1. As we saw in the last section, if the contributor C is an FSA, then we can solve the safety verification problem by guessing a sequence s g = s g w c (g) n g ∈ Sim g for every g ∈ G, where the length of s g is bounded by the number of states of C. This worked because the set of these sequences constitutes a support of Sim g ; thus, we could apply the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma. However, this is no longer true if the contributor is a PDA. In this case, the shortest sequence s g satisfying s g w c (g) n g ∈ Sim g for some n g may have exponential length in the size of the PDA.
Example 7.1. For every n ≥ 0, let C n consist of the prefixes of the word (r c (1)r c (2)) 2 n w c (3). The language C n is recognized by a PDA with O(n) states, and we have, for each n ≥ 0, a simulator Sim 3 = (ε + (r c (1)r c (2)) 2 n w c (3) + ).
We thus need to apply a different strategy. The strategy uses two generic lemmas, valid for arbitrary networks, to which we devote the next two sections.
The Decomposition Lemma
Consider again the leader of Figure 2 , consisting of the word
Given a sequence of the leader, its reads can be seen as obstacles that the leader must overcome in order to execute the sequence. To overcome the obstacles, the leader needs help in the form of contributor writes. The leader sequence can be "completed" with contributor writes in many different ways. For instance, the most "economic" completion of this sequence is
, but many other completions are possible, such as
In order to state the Decomposition Lemma, we need to define the set of all possible completions of the sequences of the leader. Observe that this is the set of sequences that obey the store rules and whose projection onto D yields a word of D.
The following proposition gives a characterization of cD, and proves that replacing the leader by its completion does not change the behavior of a network. PROPOSITION 7.3.
(1) For every leader D:
(1) We start with the left to right (⊆) inclusion.
by property of Proj
For the other direction (⊇), let u ∈ S D, that is, u is such that u ∈ S and Proj
D (u) ∈ D. Now, let u = Proj G(w ,r d )
(u). We want to show that u ∈ S and Proj
Let us turn to u ∈ S. We have that either u = u and we are done or that u = u. Moreover the definition of Proj shows that u results from u by deleting actions not in G(w , r d ). These are necessarily contributor reads (G(r c )) or corrupting writes (w c (#)). Observe that deleting a read action does not alter the current value the store is holding, while deleting a corrupting write does not disable any action it can only enable reads. Therefore, u is a legal sequence of actions complying with the store, that is, u ∈ S, and we are done.
(2) By the definition of completion, we have Proj D (cD) ⊆ D; thus, by Lemma 2.3(2) with L = cD and L = D, we get (cD D) = cD. Now we have that
Because they play an important role, let us clarify the alphabets involved in the equation
The alphabet of S is that of N s . Finally, for each g ∈ G, the alphabet of Sim g is given by G(r c ) ∪ {w c (g), w c (#)}. We are now ready to state the Decomposition Lemma:
LEMMA 7.4 (DECOMPOSITION LEMMA). For every v ∈ cD:
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Here, we only provide some intuition and an illustrating example.
Example 7.5. Consider the simulating network with G = {1, 2} such that 
(where the underbraces indicate which of Sim 1 and Sim 2 executes which action) belongs to v S (u 1 u 2 ) . We have that (v S u 1 ) = ∅ and (v S u 2 ) = ∅. Indeed, the words
obtained from Equation (10) by removing the actions executed by Sim 2 and Sim 1 , respectively, belong to (v S u 1 ) and (v S u 2 ). Let us check that this is the case for Equation (11). First, note that Equation (11) obeys the store rules, that is, Equation (11) 
which are words of D, and Sim 1 , respectively. The check for Equation (12) is similar. Imagine now that we are given Equation (11) and Equation (12) as words of (v S u 1 ) and (v S u 2 ), and we are asked to construct a word of v S (u 1 u 2 ) . For this, we first align the occurrences of the letters of v in Equation (11) and Equation (12), then construct the new word by "merging" the blocks between two consecutive occurrences:
The Leader Monotonicity Lemma
Using the Decomposition Lemma, we can show N s is unsafe by guessing a word v ∈ cD and checking that v S Sim g is nonempty for every g ∈ G. Unfortunately, the shortest v can be exponential in the input. Consider, for example, the family D = w d (1) * r d (2) w d ($) and {C(n)} n≥0 , where each C(n) consists of the prefixes of the word r c (1) 2 n w c (2). The shortest v witnessing nonemptiness of D S ∞ C(n) has length O(2 n ). In order to get a coNP upper bound, we need another combinatorial argument that shows a monotonicity property for the leader.
A first attempt at monotonicity would suggest that if v ∈ cD is a witness for nonemptiness, v ∈ cD, and v v, then v is also a witness for nonemptiness. Unfortunately, this does not hold.
Example 7.6. Let G = {1, $}, and let
Since D performs no reads, we have that
Sim $ is nonempty. However, consider the larger string
Sim $ is empty, since no behavior of the simulator starts with a write.
The solution to this problem is to appropriately rename certain actions. More precisely, we want to distinguish the first time a contributor writes a value g to the store from all the other occurrences of w c (g).
Definition 7.7. Given a word u over any alphabet including write actions for a set G ⊆ G, that is G (w c ), let u[f] be the word obtained as follows: for every g ∈ G, rename the first occurrence of w c (g) in u (if any), to f c (g), where f c is a new action standing for "first write" by a contributor (or simulator). Given a language L over an alphabet including G(w c ), we define L[f] as the language over the alphabet
Example 7.8. For the word
we get
The following proposition states that renaming the first writes does not change the behavior of the network; it only provides more fine-grained information about them:
By definition, we then have u ∈ N s ; thus, there are words v ∈ cD, v ∈ S, and v g ∈ Sim g for every g ∈ G such that u = (v v g∈G v g ). Since w c (g) belongs to the alphabets of cD, S, and Sim g , we have that We can now state the Leader Monotonicity Lemma.
LEMMA 7.10 (LEADER MONOTONICITY LEMMA). Let L ⊆ ( C ) * be a language satisfying the closed-by-write condition: if α w
The proof is technical and can be found in Appendix C. Note that the word w c (1) w d (1) w d ($) from Example 7.6 is ruled out by the lemma because f c (1)
Proof of the coNP Upper Bound
We now prove the coNP upper bound for Safety(FSA, PDA). Recall Proposition 7.3:
). We can show that N s is unsafe by guessing an unsafe sequence v ∈ cD and checking that (v S g∈G Sim g ) = ∅. By the Decomposition Lemma, we can guess an unsafe sequence v ∈ cD and check for every g ∈ G that (v S Sim g ) = ∅.
We cannot directly guess v (it can have exponential length) and must proceed differently. Instead of checking (cD S g∈G Sim g ) = ∅, we consider the equivalent problem of checking
Since both D and S are recognized by FSAs, we have that cD, given by Proj G(w ,r d ) (D S), is also recognized by an FSA whose size is polynomial in the size of the FSAs for D and S. Further, from a PDA C for C, and for each g ∈ G, we can compute a PDA for Sim g [f] that is polynomial in the size of C. To see this, recall that
where C # g is (a renaming of) the set of words C g = C/{w c (g)}. It is an exercise in automata theory to transform the PDA C recognizing C into a PDA P g recognizing Sim g , with linear blow-up.
Given FSAs cD and S recognizing cD and S, respectively, and given a PDA P g for each g ∈ G recognizing Sim g , it is also easy to construct FSAs cD [f] and S[f] for cD [f] and S [f] , and a PDA P g [f] for Sim g [f] . Since
the new PDA P g [f] has linear size in P g . However, cD [f] and S[f] are exponentially larger than cD and S. The reason is that, in both cases, the FSAs need to store the set of values g ∈ G for which there has already been a first write f c (g).
To get around this exponential blow-up, our nondeterministic algorithm guesses the sequence τ of first writes of the word v. That is, the algorithm guesses a subset of G and an ordering of this subset. For example, if G = {1, 2, 3}, then there are 16 possibilities for τ : 6 sequences giving all possible permutations of { f c (1), f c (2), f c (3)}, 6 sequences giving possible orderings { f c (i) f c ( j) | i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i = j}, the 3 sequences { f c (1), f c (2), f c (3)}, and finally, the sequence ε.
Since |τ | ≤ |G|, it can be guessed in polynomial time. We can then compute in polynomial time an FSA cD [f] τ recognizing the words of cD[f] whose projection onto G(f c ) is equal to τ . The same holds for S [f] τ . After this preprocessing, we are left with our new task: nondeterministically check in polynomial time
Using the Decomposition Lemma, we can perform this check one PDA Sim g at a time. However, we cannot directly guess a v ∈ cD [f] τ , as such a witness can be exponentially long. Instead, we proceed as follows.
The algorithm guesses a
e., an FSA derived from cD [f] τ by deleting some states and transitions) satisfying the following properties:
Since the projection of all words of E[f]
τ onto first writes is equal to τ , the condition
The algorithm then checks in polynomial time that, for each g ∈ G, we have that
) = ∅ and uses the Leader Monotonicity Lemma to assemble a witness.
Before giving the technical details of the algorithm, the following lemma about FSAs shows that such a choice of E [f] τ is always possible. 
Furthermore, given an arbitrary subautomaton A of A, we can check in polynomial time that it belongs to the collection.
We show how Lemma 7.11 can be used to prove the main result of this section. THEOREM 7.12. Safety(FSA, PDA) ∈ coNP PROOF. As in the preceding discussion, our starting point is the check
The algorithm nondeterministically guesses the (at most length |G|) sequence τ of first writes and we are left with the following check:
As discussed earlier, the FSAs for cD [f] τ and S [f] τ are of size polynomial in the input, and for each g ∈ G, the PDA Sim g [f] is also polynomial in the input. All these machines can be computed in polynomial time in the input.
We discharge the check (14) in the following two steps.
(1) First, using Lemma 7.11, the algorithm guesses a subautomaton
Note that, since the projection of all words of E[f]
τ onto first writes is equal to τ , the condition v 3 G(f c ) v 1 and v 3 G(f c ) v 2 is equivalent to v 3 v 1 and v 3 v 2 . Moreover, the guessed E [f] τ is such that if (14) holds, then
is over alphabet C and is closed by writes:
We sketch why this check can be performed in nondeterministic polynomial time in the input. The FSA E [f] τ can be computed in nondeterministic polynomial time by Lemma 7.11: guess a subautomaton and check in polynomial time that it belongs to the collection {A 1 , . 
), since the asynchronous product of a PDA and a fixed number of FSAs can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the inputs. Finally, we can check the nonemptiness of N in polynomial time.
We prove that the algorithm is correct. It suffices to show: There is a word v
(⇒): This part is identical to the argument for the Decomposition Lemma. Let
). Then, there are words u g ∈ Sim g [f] for each g ∈ G that appear as scattered subwords in x and for which x ∈ (v S [f] τ g∈G u g ). Further, the scattered subwords are disjoint for all g = g. Now, for each g, take x g to be the scattered subword of x obtained by removing all u g for g = g. Then
It also follows from Lemma 2.3(1) that
τ , and repeated applications of the Leader Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 7.10) with
show that we can G( f c )-cover all the separate witnesses
τ shows that there exists uĝ G(f c ) u g i for i = 1, 2; hence, we find that (uĝ
where v is the result of replacing all actions in G(f c ) by the corresponding action in G(w c ). Since v ∈ cD, we can apply the Decomposition Lemma, which shows that v S g∈G Sim g = ∅ and finally that cD S g∈G Sim g = ∅. To conclude the proof, we prove Lemma 7.11. PROOF (OF LEMMA 7.11). Let π be an accepting run in A such that no state repeats in π . Define A π to be the FSA that consists exactly of (1) the states and transitions of π ; and (2) the states and transitions of the strongly connected components (sccs) visited by π .
Clearly, A π results from removing states and transitions from A. Define the set {A 1 , . . . , A d } such that each accepting run π with no repeating state induces exactly one automaton A π ∈ {A 1 , . . . , A d }. This set is finite since there are only finitely many states and transitions in A. Furthermore, it is easily checked that
We turn to Point 3. Because no state is repeated, π fixes a total order on the sccs it visits (and are also included in A π ). Thus, any two accepting runs in A π must visit the sccs in that order. Therefore, it suffices to show that given an scc, any two words drawn upon that scc are covered by a third one. This is easily seen from the definition of subword ordering and the fact that, in an scc, all states are mutually reachable.
SAFETY(PDA, PDA) IS PSPACE-COMPLETE

SAFETY(PDA, PDA) is PSPACE-hard
PSPACE-hardness is shown by reduction from the acceptance problem of a polynomialspace deterministic Turing machine. The proof is technical. The leader and contributors simulate steps of the Turing machine in rounds. The stack is used to store configurations of the Turing machine. In each round, the leader sends the current configuration of the Turing machine to contributors by writing the configuration one element at a time on to the store and waiting for an acknowledgment from some contributor that the element was received. The contributors receive the current configuration and store the next configuration on their stacks. In the second part of the round, the contributors send back the configuration to the leader. The leader and contributors use their finite state to make sure that all elements of the configuration are sent and received.
Additionally, the leader and the contributors use the stack to count to 2 n steps. If both the leader and some contributor count to 2 n in a computation, the construction ensures that the Turing machine has been correctly simulated for 2 n steps, and the simulation is successful. The counting eliminates bad computation sequences in which contributors conflate the configurations from different steps due to asynchronous reads and writes. THEOREM 8.1. Safety(PDA, PDA) is PSPACE-hard.
PROOF OF THEOREM 8.1. We give a reduction from the acceptance problem of a linear space-bounded deterministic Turing machine to the complement of the safety verification problem. Fix a deterministic TM M that on input of size n uses at most n tape cells and accepts in exactly 2 n steps. We are given an input x and want to check if M accepts x. An accepting run is a sequence of TM configurations c 0 → c 1 → · · · → c 2 n , where c 0 is the initial configuration (the input x is written on the tape, the head points to the leftmost cell, and the TM is in its initial state), there is a transition of the TM from c i to c i+1 for i = 0, . . . , 2 n − 1, and c 2 n is accepting. Following these assumptions, configurations of M can be encoded by words of fixed length.
We define a (D, C)-network that simulates M and such that D = L(D) and C = L(C), where D and C are PDAs. The leader and the contributors cooperatively simulate computations of M using their stack, and also use the stack to count up to 2 n steps. We start by describing the basic gadgets used in the simulation.
Counting to 2 n using n stack symbols. We show how a contributor can use its stack to count down from 2 n . Consider a stack alphabet of with n + 2 symbols {I 0 , . . . , I n } ∪ {$}, where $ is a special bottom-of-stack marker. Given a stack over this alphabet, the contributor PDA, provided the top of the stack is I i for some 0 ≤ i ≤ n, performs a decrement operation defined as follows:
(1) While the top of the stack is I i for some i > 0, do pop(I i ); push(I i−1 ); push(I i−1 ); (2) pop(I 0 ) and return;
Suppose initially that the stack contains I n $ (the bottom of the stack is to the right). Then, we reach a stack with $ on the top exactly after popping I 0 2 n times, that is, after performing 2 n times the decrement operation.
Simulating one step of the TM. The network iteratively simulates one step of M as follows: the leader sends the current configuration of M to the contributors, then the contributors send back the next configuration to the leader. More precisely, assume that the reverse of a configuration of the Turing machine is stored as a word w of length n in the stack of the leader. We want to ensure that, at the end of the protocol, the stack of the leader contains the reversal of a successor configuration of M. If the leader could be sure that there is a unique contributor, the task would be easy: the leader pops its stack, writing its contents one symbol at a time in the store, waiting after each step for an acknowledgement of the contributor. Then, it proceeds to read the new configuration from the store, also one symbol at a time, acknowledging after each read, and pushes the symbols into its stack. The contributor behaves symmetrically, with the difference that what it pushes into its stack is not the configuration sent by the leader, but a successor configuration, which it computes on-the-fly, as the symbols arrive. This procedure works independently of the length of the configuration; thus, the leader and its single contributor can simulate an arbitrary Turing machine.
However, in the presence of an unbounded number of contributors, the leader has no guarantee that all messages it reads have been sent by the same contributor, and that this contributor has read all previous messages from the leader. To solve this problem, we use the following protocol. The leader and contributors use their finite set of control states to count till n. The leader pops one symbol of w at a time from its stack, writes it onto the global store, and waits for an acknowledgment from some contributor that the symbol has been received. Conversely, the contributors read the letters of w one symbol at a time from the global store. Moreover, using its finite state, the contributors compute the successor configuration of the configuration that is received from the leader and store it on to their stacks. Additionally, a contributor sends an acknowledgment for the receipt of each symbol read from the leader.
After n steps of the leader and contributors, the stack of the leader is empty and the stack of the contributor contains w where w can be reached from w R by executing one step in M.
Note that, at the end of this part of the protocol, in spite of asynchronous reads and writes, the leader is certain that all n symbols were received in order, but not necessarily by the same contributor.
The second part of the protocol sends this configuration back from a contributor to the leader. Again, the leader and the contributor use their finite state to count till n. The contributor sends n symbols one at a time to the leader, and waits for an acknowledgement to check that the leader read the same symbol it transferred. After n steps, the leader's stack contains the reverse of w and the contributor's stack is again empty. Moreover, the contributor is certain that the entire configuration has been correctly received by the leader.
Note that, even in the presence of nonatomic reads and writes, if the leader and some contributor successfully reach the end of the protocol, then the leader and that particular contributor has faithfully simulated one step of the machine. However, we cannot ensure that the same contributor participated in one whole round of the protocol, always reading and writing the latest values and faithfully simulating one step of the Turing machine. For example, it is possible that several contributors, that have simulated the Turing machine for different numbers of steps, participate in the protocol. The simulation catches these discrepancies by counting, as described here.
The reduction. Initially, all contributors push I n $ onto their stacks. The leader pushes I n $ onto the stack, and additionally, the reverse of the starting configuration of the Turing machine.
Then, the leader and contributors execute the protocol described earlier. At the end of the first part of a round, the leader perform a decrement. At the end of the second part of a round, the contributor perform a decrement.
The network accepts the computation (e.g., by outputting a special symbol $) if (1) both the leader and some contributor count up to 2 n ; and (2) at that point, the Turing machine is in an accepting configuration.
Note that if the leader interacts with the same contributor for 2 n rounds, then both will simultaneously reduce the counter on the stack to $ at the same time, thus would have correctly simulated the Turing machine for 2 n steps. Thus, if the stack encodes an accepting configuration, the Turing machine accepts.
Conversely, if the leader interacts with multiple contributors in different rounds, then there will not be any contributor whose count reaches 2 n simultaneously with the leader. All such computations are not faithful simulations of the Turing machine; therefore, none leads to accepting the computation.
Finally, we note that, in this reduction, all processes are deterministic machines.
Safety(PDA, PDA) is in PSPACE
We sketch the upper PSPACE bound, which uses constructions on approximations of context-free languages. 
+ , where C # g is (a relabeling of) the set of words u containing no occurrence of w c (g) and satisfying u w c (g) ∈ C. One can transform the PDA for C into a PDA for C # g with linear blow-up, and this into a PDA P g for Sim g . Thus, Equation (15) 
= ∅, which suggests the following naïve nondeterministic algorithm:
-Guess step by step a sequence
where, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, a i is an action, and i is a triple consisting of a value g, a configuration γ d of cD, and a set {γ g | g ∈ G} of configurations of the PDAs P g . -At each step, check that i+1 is a successor of i under the action a i according to the network semantics.
However, since storing a configuration of a PDA may require an arbitrary amount of memory, there is no guarantee that the algorithm runs in (nondeterministic) polynomial space.
In the following, we show how we refine this algorithm to get a PSPACE upper bound. This requires several technical ingredients. 
We cannot directly combine this result with the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma, because the latter is only applicable to w c (g)-supports. However, recall that we have 
and P g are very similar PDAs, it is easy to see that Sim g is also recognized by runs of P g with a linearly bounded stack. Applying the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma, we obtain that (15) is equivalent to checking
where N is the number of stack symbols of Sim g , which is bounded by some polynomial in |C|.
(To be precise, N depends on g, but to avoid clutter in the notation, let us take the maximum over all g ∈ G.) Thus, it suffices to guess a sequence ρ in which the stacks of the simulators are linearly bounded (in |C|).
Ingredient 2: Generalized Leader Monotonicity Lemma. The second problem with the naïve algorithm is that the stack of the leader can be unbounded. Here, we need a second technical ingredient: a generalization of the Leader Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 7.10) that allows replacing the language of the leader by a related language, its cover.
Given two languages L, L over the same alphabet , we say that L is a cover of L if L ⊆ L and for every u ∈ L, there is v ∈ L such that u v, where is the subword ordering. Further, given
where is the -subword ordering, in which we are only allowed to remove symbols in \ . Observe that, for every u, v ∈ L such that u ≺ v, if L is a cover, then so is L \ {u}.
We 
. We can thus apply Lemma 7.10 and obtain
Consider again the network of Example 7.6. Introducing first-writes we get
The system 
Putting it All Together. We now give the details of the construction. PROOF. We give a nondeterministic polynomial space algorithm. Our starting point is Equation (15). Using the Support Theorem and the Contributor Monotonicity Lemma, we reduce the proof obligation to checking Equation (16). At this point, we want to invoke the Generalized Leader Monotonicity Lemma; thus, we focus on checking Summarizing, we are left with the problem of deciding
in polynomial space, where G cD and S τ are a CFG and an FSA constructed by a polynomial time algorithm, and A is an FSA of exponential size constructed by an algorithm running in polynomial space. Now, by the closure properties of regular and context-free languages with respect to asynchronous product, there exists an operator that, given a CFG G and an FSA A, constructs in polynomial time in |G| + |A| a CFG G A recognizing L(G) L(A). Then, there is an exponential time and polynomial space algorithm to construct the context-free grammar
A , which recognizes Equation (17). Thus, we are left with the problem of deciding
in polynomial space in the size of D and C.
Suppose that the emptiness problem for G τ could be decided in polylogarithmic space. Then, we could resort to a generic result of complexity theory (e.g., see Lemma 4.17, Arora and Barak [2009] 
(Space Composition Theorem) Given functions f, g : * → * , if f and g can be computed by s f -and s g -space-bounded Turing machines, respectively, then g( f (x)) can be computed in log(
We apply this result by choosing f and g as follows:
-f is the function that computes G τ on input (D, C) (and nondeterministically guessing τ ).
-g is the function that, on input G τ , returns 1 if G τ is nonempty, and 0 otherwise.
Then, g • f is the characteristic function of Safety(PDA, PDA). By the Space Composition Theorem, g • f can be computed in polynomial space. We conclude that, if emptiness of G τ could be checked in polylogarithmic space, then Safety(PDA, PDA) ∈ PSPACE would follow.
At this point, however, we seem to reach a dead end, because G τ is a context-free grammar. The emptiness problem for context-free grammars is P-complete [Jones and Laaser 1974] , and there is no known polylogarithmic space algorithm for the problem. Thus, since G is exponential in the size of the input, an algorithm that first constructs G and then checks for emptiness runs in exponential space.
In the final step of the proof, we get around this problem by substituting L(G τ ) by a cover that has nicer structural properties. Loosely speaking, we use leader monotonicity to show that the emptiness check can be replaced by the so-called k-index emptiness check, which is solvable in polylogarithmic space
We need some results of language theory about the k-index approximations of a context-free language [Brainerd 1967 ] (see Appendix A for formal definitions). Given a CFG G = (X , g , P, X 0 ), we denote by L (k) (G) the set of words of L(G) that can be derived from X 0 by means of a derivation in which every intermediate string contains at most k occurrences of nonterminals. Formally, let (k) ⇒ be the subrelation of the step relation ⇒ defined as follows: u 
We call the sequence of steps from X 0 to w ∈ * a k-index derivation. Appendix A proves, or provides references for, the following results:
where m is the number of nonterminals of G. 
Since G τ has exponential size, and m cD is bounded by a polynomial, by (c) we can apply the Space Composition Theorem as follows:
-f is the function that, on input (D, C) , returns G τ and 3m cD . -g is the function that, on input (G, k), returns 1 if L (k) (G) = ∅, and 0 otherwise.
It follows that L 3m cD (G τ ) = ∅ can be decided in nondeterministic polynomial space. By Savitch's theorem, we conclude that Safety(PDA, PDA) is in PSPACE.
We note that our language-theoretic constructions (the Support Theorem and results (a), (b), and (c) in the earlier proof) improve upon previous constructions, and are all required for the optimal upper bound. Hague [2011] shows an alternate doubly exponential construction using a result of Ehrenfeucht and Rozenberg in place of Theorem A.3. This gave a 2EXPTIME algorithm. Even after using our exponential time construction for A g , we can only get an EXPTIME algorithm, since the nonemptiness problem for (general) context-free languages is P-complete [Jones and Laaser 1974] . Our bounded-index approximation for the cover and the space-efficient emptiness algorithm for bounded-index languages are crucial to the PSPACE upper bound.
DISCUSSIONS
We have classified the complexity of safety verification for parameterized systems with a distinguished leader communicating through finite-state shared memory without any synchronization. Our upper bounds are surprising, because the complexity of the problem can be significantly higher (even undecidable) in slightly different settings [Esparza 2014] .
We now discuss two additional directions. The first is the special symmetric case, in which all participants run the same "code." We show that this case can be solved in polynomial time. The second is where we bound the number of steps that each individual participant can perform. We show that, if the bound is given in unary, the problem remains coNP-complete even when each participant is an arbitrary Turing machine.
The Symmetric Case
In the symmetric case, we have D = C, that is, the leader and the contributors have the same language. We consider the safety verification problem in this setting and show that it is in polynomial time when the leader and the contributors are given by a PDA.
Because all processes are identical, we can alternately assume that the distinguished leader process is the language {ε}, and consider the problem whether the ({ε}, C)-network N is safe. Note that, in this case, we modify the definition of safety and require that some participant writes the special value $. By replacing S by Proj C (S), we can completely discard D and D and rewrite the safety verification problem as follows: 
= ∅. Then, we have that at no point along the history of computation (wAcc) i = $ for some i. In particular, at no point in time wAcc contains all the first-writes of τ . Let i be the least position in τ such that (τ ) i is never added to wAcc. That is, the conditional of the if statement always fails for (τ ) i . We derive a contradiction. We assume that all values of τ up to position (i − 1) eventually appear in wAcc. Thus, if the conditional always fails for (τ ) i , we have that [f] , for g ∈ G, can both be computed in polynomial time in the input. Second, because a * 1 · · · a * n coincides with {a 1 , . . . , a n } * , where each a i is an alphabet symbol, we can replace the conditional of the if statement by the equivalent
by adding self-loops labeled with w c (g ) at every state. Also, given a word w and a PDA P, an easy polynomial-time construction produces a PDA that accepts w · L(P). Finally, we compute the asynchronous product of S [f] wAcc and this PDA to get a PDA that is polynomial in the size of the input. Emptiness of this machine can be checked in polynomial time. Thus, overall, the runtime is bounded by a polynomial in |C|.
We complete the proof by proving Lemma 9.1. PROOF OF LEMMA 9.1. We prove the lemma by induction on the length d. If d = 1, then the result trivially holds.
For the inductive case, we require the following equivalence:
if and only if
and
whenever j is the least position such that (u) j ∈ X . As expected, a step sequence is kindex if all its steps are k-index. For a given integer constant k > 0, a word u ∈ ( ∪ X ) * is said to be of index k if u contains at most k occurrences of nonterminals (formally, |Proj X (u)| ≤ k). A step u ⇒ v is said to be k-index, denoted u (k) =⇒ v, if and only if both u and v are of index k. Given G and k, define L (k) (G) to be the set {w ∈ * | X 0 (k) =⇒ * w}. It is routine to check that L (k) (G) ⊆ L(G) for every k > 0. We now complete the proof of Theorem 8.4 by providing the language-theoretic constructions. We assume familiarity with basic formal language theory [Sipser 1996 ].
Asynchronous product of CFGs and FSAs. Given a CFG G in CNF and an FSA A, we now define a CFG G A such that L(G A) = L(G) L(A).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of accepting states of A is a singleton. We further show that the k-index language of G A is the asynchronous product of the k-index language of G and the language of A. Definition A.1. Given a CFG G = (X , g , P, X 0 ) in CNF and an FSA A = (Q, a , δ, q 0 , {q f }), we define G = (X , g ∪ a , P , X 0 ) as follows: -X = Q × (X ∪ {ε}) × Q; -X 0 = q 0 , X 0 , q f ; -P contains no more than the following transitions:
(1) if X → σ ∈ P and σ / ∈ a , then q, X, q → σ q, ε, q ∈ P (case σ ∈ g \ a or σ = ε) (2) if σ / ∈ g and (q, σ, q ) ∈ δ, then q, Z, q → σ q , Z, q ∈ P for all Z ∈ X ∪ {ε} (case σ ∈ a \ g or σ = ε) (3) if X → σ ∈ P, (q, σ, q ) ∈ δ, and σ = ε, then q, X, q → σ q , ε, q ∈ P (case σ ∈ g ∩ a ) (4) if X → Y Z ∈ P, then q 1 , X, q 2 → q 1 , Y,, Z, q 2 ∈ P for every q ∈ Q. (5) q, ε, q → ε ∈ P for every q ∈ Q.
PROPOSITION A.2. Let G, A, and G as in Definition
A.1. We have L (k) (G A) = L (k) (G) L(A) for every k ≥ 1; hence, L(G A) = L
(G) L(A). Moreover, G is computable in time polynomial in |G| + |A|.
PROOF. It suffices to show that, for each q, q ∈ Q, X ∈ X , and k ≥ 1: q, X, q =⇒ * w g in G, and there is a run in A from q to q that reads w a , formally: ∃q 1 , . . . , q n+1 ∈ Q, ∃σ 1 , . . . , σ n ∈ : (q i , σ i , q i+1 ) ∈ δ for all i < n, w a = σ 1 . . . σ n . From Definition A.1, it is clear that G is computable in time polynomial in |G| and |A|.
Computing an FSA supporting L(G).
We first show that, given a CFG G, one can construct an FSA accepting a support of L(G) and whose size is at most exponentially larger than the size of G. (prov(i)) j+1 · · · (prov(i)) |α i | . That is, either the provenance information is inherited from the nonterminal (α i ) j (= Z) that has been rewritten yielding the |z| copies of (prov(i)) j in prov(i + 1) or it remains unchanged ((prov(i)) k for all k = j). Note that prov(i) is a word over alphabet {1, . . . , |α 0 |} and that |prov(i)| = |α i | for all i.
Let us turn back to the step sequence BC (k) =⇒ * w, whose last step α n−1 p/j =⇒ α n is the application of some production p at some position j of α n−1 . Since α 0 = BC, necessarily we have that (prov(n − 1)) j is either 1 or 2. Assume that (prov(n − 1)) j = 2 (the other case is treated similarly). Define a new step sequence by removing from BC =⇒ α i+1 such that (prov(i)) j = 2. Intuitively, we discard all the steps that rewrite a nonterminal stemming from the initial C since (α 0 ) 2 = C.
The resulting step sequence has the form BC PROOF. We give a nondeterministic space algorithm given Algorithm 2. The algorithm, called query, takes two parameters, a nonterminal X ∈ X and a number ≥ 1, and guesses an -index derivation of some word starting from X. To do so, the algorithm guesses a production (X, w) ∈ P. Observe that the nonterminal parameter coincides with the head of the production. If X → σ is chosen, for σ ∈ ∪ {ε}, it returns. If X → BC for some nonterminals B and C is chosen, the algorithm nondeterministically looks (using a recursive call) (i) for an ( − 1)-index derivation from B and an -index derivation from C, or (ii) for an ( − 1)-index derivation from C and an -index derivation from B.
We show the following invariant: query( , X) has an execution that returns if and only if X The left-to-right direction is proved by induction on the number m of times that productions are picked in an execution of query that returns. If m = 1, then ≥ 1 and a production (X, σ ) ∈ P, where σ ∈ ∪ {ε} must have been picked, hence the derivation X Clearly, σ also obeys the store rules; thus, we have that σ ∈ S and also, by Lemma 2.3(1), v σ = σ , hence that v σ ∈ S, and finally that v σ ∈ v S. Define σ as the projection of σ onto alphabets of the simulators for G 1 ∪ {g}, namely, g ∈G 1 ∪{g} g . By definition of x and y whose respective alphabets are g ∈G 1 g and g , clearly σ ∈ (x y). Then, we conclude from Lemma 2.3(1) that σ σ = σ , hence that v σ σ ∈ v S, next that v σ σ ∈ v S (x y), and thus that v S (x y) = ∅, which concludes the proof.
C. APPENDIX: PROOF OF THE LEADER MONOTONICITY LEMMA
We now give the proof of the Leader Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 7.10). 
